Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Sheila Wildeman

2013

Protecting Rights and Building Capacities:
Challenges to Global Mental Health Policy in
Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities
Sheila Wildeman, Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/sheila-wildeman/1/

Protecting Rights
and Building
Capacities:
Challenges to
Global Mental
Health Policy
in Light of the
Convention on the
Rights of Persons
with Disabilities
Sheila Wildeman

T

he World Health Organization (WHO) has in
the last decade identified mental health as a
priority for global health promotion and international development, to be targeted through promulgation of evidence-based medical practices, health
systems reform, and respect for human rights. Yet
these overlapping strategies are marked by tensions
as the historical primacy of expert-led initiatives is
increasingly subject to challenge by new social movements — in particular, disabled persons’ organizations
(DPOs). These tensions come into focus upon situating the WHO’s contributions to the analysis of global
mental health in light of the negotiation and early
stages of implementation of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),1 particularly as it applies to persons with mental disabilities.
To clarify, I distinguish “mental” from “intellectual”
disability (as does the CRPD2) and use the former
term interchangeably with “psychosocial” disability, a term favored within the disability community
to denote mental health conditions without rooting
these in individual pathology. The focus of my analysis
is psychosocial or mental disability; however, at times
the analysis has clear application also to intellectual
disability or to forms of state action to which persons
with intellectual disabilities may also be subject.3
Commentators have remarked upon the importance
of the CRPD in bringing together in one instrument
civil and political with economic, social and cultural
rights, supplemented by state obligations to support
political participation.4 Yet, arguably as a function of
unprecedented participation of those most directly
affected, the CRPD has generated controversies about
the implications of recognizing persons with disabilities, and in particular, psychosocial disabilities,
as bearers of these inter-related human rights. These
controversies may be regarded as inevitable byproducts of the CRPD’s fragile reconciliation of historically
polarized ideas and interests. My discussion makes
particular note of contestation around Articles 14 and
17 (liberty and integrity of the person) and Article 12
(equal legal capacity).
I argue that the inclusive negotiation history of
the CRPD, and more immediately, the important
obligations this convention imposes with regard to
participatory implementation, hold out much promise for vindicating the rightful status of persons with
psychosocial and intellectual disabilities as political
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actors and so equal legal subjects rather than objects
of others’ (well- or ill-intentioned) interventions.5 The
controversies discussed herein may be regarded as
illustrative of the CRPD’s function in operationalizing
political agency among persons historically relegated
to categories of disability deemed inconsistent with
agency. But the question remains: what are the implications for global mental health policy?
The article proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces
certain tensions, as well as points of convergence,
between global mental health policy as articulated
at the WHO and the attentiveness to social context (including relationships of power and oppression) and to subjective experience that is essential to
human rights analysis. Part II introduces the social
model of disability — forged in opposition to the
dominance of professional knowledge — and positions the anti-psychiatry movement in relation to
both the social and human rights models of disability.
Part III turns to the CRPD, noting the key role played
by DPOs (including those representing persons with
psychosocial disabilities and those representing persons with intellectual disabilities) in the negotiation
and drafting of this instrument, and briefly introducing the substantive rights and implementation measures included in it. Part IV examines two controversies engendered by the CRPD: first, concerning the
legitimacy of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization
and treatment, and second, concerning the meaning
or implications of the right to equal legal capacity.
These controversies illustrate the radical challenges
to global mental health policy that have gained new
legitimacy and momentum through the participation
of DPOs in the CRPD process.
Part V concludes with reflections on the prospects
for carrying forward the CRPD’s commitments to
inclusive or participatory mental health policy-making at the global and domestic levels. While there is a
risk of continued polarization and of a retrenchment
of historic patterns of exclusion, states parties — along
with international agencies, civil society organizations
including DPOs, and academics — should seek to
deepen mutual engagement around the imperatives of
the CRPD in order to shift global mental health policy
from coercive approaches toward innovative supports,
in accordance with the interlocking values of autonomy, equality, and political participation.

I. Global Mental Health Policy
The last decade has seen a remarkable intensification
of international policy discourse directed at global
mental health, after a long period of relative silence.
The growth in international attention is largely justified within this discourse by way of a relatively
global health and the law • spring 2013

straightforward utilitarian calculus. On that analysis,
estimates of prevalence — typically focused on conditions classed as neuropsychiatric disorders6 — are
paired with estimates of associated costs, followed by
observations about systemic inefficiencies and calls for
reform. One prominent expression of this line of analysis in the WHO literature highlights the contribution
of a set of mental disorders to the “global burden of
disease”: a term of art which factors premature death
together with diagnosis-specific discounting of years
lived with disability.7 Recent estimates suggest that
mental disorders contribute 14% of the total calculated global burden of disease,8 with depression ranking as top contributor in high income nations and as
third contributor worldwide.9 Other WHO documents
focus upon global economic losses linked to mental health conditions, based on impact on economic
growth,10 loss of income, and direct and indirect medical and non-medical costs.11 In this vein, the WHO’s
executive committee has endorsed the estimate that
“the cumulative global impact of mental disorders
in terms of lost economic output will amount to US
$16,000 billion over the next 20 years.”12
Against this background come critiques of current
approaches to mental health promotion and treatment. Evidence of high rates of untreated mental
health conditions13 are juxtaposed with low resourcing of mental health in comparison to somatic conditions.14 This pattern is identified worldwide; moreover, WHO data indicate that significantly less is
spent on mental health by low-income nations than by
high-income ones, both in per capita and proportionate budgetary terms.15 This includes strikingly lower
expenditures on psycho-pharmaceuticals.16 The attendant policy critiques are aimed not simply at resourcing but, in addition, at inefficiencies, including lack of
coordination among existing mental health and social
services, and the concentration of resources on hospital versus community-based services.17 In response,
initiatives launched by the WHO18 and other organizations such as the strategically expert-steered Movement for Global Mental Health19 seek to promote
evidence-based mental health treatment20 (focused
primarily, though not exclusively, on psychopharmaceutical interventions)21 in tandem with systemic
reforms that aim to be sensitive to variances in economic conditions and human resource capacities.22
Moreover, and specifically in response to the data suggesting high prevalence combined with low resourcing
among low-income countries, WHO policy is increasingly directed toward linking global mental health to
the work of international development, for instance,
through calls to integrate mental health targets into
the Millennium Development Goals.23
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But let us pause to consider some critiques that may
cal or ideological — on the nature of mental disability?
be raised to the utilitarian calculus that underpins
What would this mean for the design and implementhe recent prominence of global mental health on the
tation of instruments and for the uses of assembled
international health policy stage. One critique goes to
data?
prevalence, or to the conceptual and analytical conA second critique of the utilitarian calculus animatstructs through which mental health and mental dising global mental health policy discourse takes aim at
ability are mapped in the first place. There is as yet no
the characterization of mental health conditions as
standardized method for assembling data about the
burdens or economic losses. Here we may start with
prevalence of disability generally or mental disability
calculation of the global burden of disease. That calin particular, and comparisons across existing methculation, as noted, is based in part in the construct of
ods of data collection are highly unreliable.24 This has
the disability-adjusted-life-year, arrived at by assigninspired intensive efforts to select among available
ing specific diseases or disorders fixed life-year-distools, both to orient global health policy and to enable
counting effects.32 This does not factor in available
human rights monitoring with respect to disability.25
supports, subjective attitudes or values, or other matYet such efforts are beset by complexities, rooted
ters that may affect whether an individual flourishes
in part in the fact that prevalence estimation is not
or languishes.33 Such estimates therefore lack the
value- or interest-neutral.26 Rather, the assessment of
attentiveness to context essential to appreciating the
disability prevalence requires selection and prioritinature, causes and consequences of disability, includzation among various features of complex social and
ing mental disability — from either a health or human
individual phenomena. As such, the conceptual and
rights perspective.
normative frame that one brings to prevalence
estimation is likely not only to affect the results,
but moreover, to play a profound role in strucIn short, the danger of the sort of
turing subsequent processes of decision-makutilitarian calculus that has become a
ing about strategic action.
Further complexities arise specifically with
centerpiece of global mental health policy
respect to estimating the prevalence of psychois that it may encourage pre-existing
social disability. For instance, not all individutendencies to discount the complexity of
als who may be diagnosed with a mental health
condition will self-identify as such27 — whether
both the subjective experience and social
because of social stigma or because alternative
foundations of mental disability.
frameworks (whether spiritual or other interpretive frameworks)28 present more compelling ways of integrating one’s experience. Such
complexities only deepen in the face of cultural differTurning to the calculation of economic loss, it may
ence. Indeed, drawing upon the thesis that important
be argued that such an approach is the necessary
differences may register across cultures, not only with
handmaiden of policy analysis and reform. Yet transrespect to how mental health conditions are underlation of the complex social and subjective dimenstood but how they manifest (both symptomology and
sions of mental health problems into economic burprognosis),29 one may speculate that prevalence estidens34 — at least, without significant care in devising
mation on Western disease-based models may potenand relaying those calculations — risks encouraging
tially contribute to population-wide alterations in the
a dangerous strategic reductionism. That is, particuexperience of mental disability. This in turn raises the
larly when paired with broad claims about the effecprospect (a highly profitable one from the vantage of
tiveness of psycho-pharmaceutical treatments (in the
international pharmaceutical interests) of replicatabsence of attention to such factors as high rates of
ing among developing nations/emerging markets the
inefficacy,35 intercultural elements, and the range of
accelerating incidence of psychiatric disorders and
reasons for treatment resistance36 including but not
attendant “shrinking of the normal”30 that characlimited to health-compromising side effects),37 such
terizes the nations now exporting neuropsychiatric
analysis may reinforce widely-held beliefs that there
knowledge.31 Viewed in this light, the work of mapare simple ways to “fix” the individual and social probping prevalence begins to blur uncomfortably with the
lems identified. This in turn has the potential to reinimperatives of BigPharma. Thus one may ask: should,
force widespread attitudes of resentment and recrimior could, prevalence estimation take account of alternation as well as reflexive attributions of incapacity or
native perspectives — individual, cultural, also politilack of insight38 aimed at those who refuse or discon50
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tinue psychiatric treatments.39 What may be lost along
the way is attentiveness to the interweaving of mental
health conditions with individual values and identity,
as well as social determinants — not only “stigma” but
political economy (for instance, the increasing concentration of wealth and concomitant assignment of evergrowing numbers to unemployment or dehumanizing work and so to increased vulnerability to mental
health problems).40 In short, the danger of the sort of
utilitarian calculus that has become a centerpiece of
global mental health policy is that it may encourage
pre-existing tendencies to discount the complexity of
both the subjective experience and social foundations
of mental disability.
It is debatable whether the concerns raised regarding estimations of prevalence and of associated burdens may be alleviated in some measure by the classificatory model promoted by the WHO for informing
assessment of disability prevalence and policy
responses thereto: the International Classification of
Functioning, Disability, and Health (ICF).41 In contrast to the symptom-based schema of the DSM-IV42
or ICD-10,43 the ICF enables a multi-dimensional
description of the interaction of individual impairments and the social environments that promote or
diminish individual functioning. In this it advances
a “bio-psycho-social” model of disability, which
some have argued is well suited to data-gathering at
the intersection of public health policy and human
rights.44 However, in addition to criticism regarding
the complexity and so practicability of this classificatory scheme,45 other concerns touch again upon power
and oppression. Some argue that the ICF allows too
much scope for continued prioritization of a disease
model of impairment, thus undercutting the most critical or radical social analyses of disability;46 this was
suggested by some DPOs at the CRPD negotiations.47
Others raise the Foucauldian concern that the ICF’s
unparalleled attention to the details of disabled persons’ attitudes and activities enables unprecedented
surveillance,48 and with this, new (if unintended) possibilities for incursions upon autonomy as well as new
bases for disentitlement from social benefits.49
If, as suggested, estimations of disability prevalence
and interpretations of the data generated thereby are
always informed by a prior normative framework,
then one question to be pursued is what that normative framework is or should be. (Let us shelve for the
moment the question of whether any such normative
or justificatory framework might mask the operation
of a different, and perhaps more sinister, functionality). Here we may turn to a further important element
in the discourse of contemporary global mental health
policy: human rights.50 A fitting starting-point is the
global health and the law • spring 2013

acknowledgement, in the 2010 WHO report on Mental
Health and Development,51 of a “bi-directional” relationship between mental health and human rights.52
This recognizes, on the one hand, that mental health
problems render one vulnerable to denial of human
rights, including subjection to violence — for girls and
women with mental disabilities, particularly sexual
violence53 — as well as discrimination manifesting
in disproportionately low access to health and other
social supports and attendant exposure to poverty and
homelessness. On the other hand, the bi-directionality
thesis recognizes that human rights violations have a
causal effect in rendering one vulnerable to mental
health problems.54 Here the acknowledged determinants again include violence, inequality, and lack of
accessible social supports, including income supports
and adequate housing. In acknowledging that factors
such as socio-economic inequality (including gender
and racial inequality) may give rise to mental health
problems, the bi-directionality thesis simply tracks
scientific consensus.55 But what is of note is the WHO’s
adoption of the normative framework of human rights
as a mechanism for calling down a political response.
In this it is important that the discourse adopted is not
exclusively or even in the main directed at establishing
a right to individualized medical treatment. Rather,
the central claim is that states must promote the social
determinants of mental health. This is complemented
by development discourse linking mental health with
productive and responsible citizenship and so with the
social and economic health of nations.56 In this way,
global mental health is positioned as a unifying ideal
traversing the domains of medicine, law, economics
and politics. Moreover, it is positioned in a manner
that both fundamentally challenges and fundamentally preserves the global political-economic status
quo — effectively nesting a rights-based egalitarianism within a capitalist ethic of productivity and attendant concern for reliable and ever-expanding supplies
of human capital.
It is important, however, also to note a more targeted
approach to mental health and human rights taken
by the WHO. Its Resource Book on Mental Health,
Human Rights and Legislation57 assembles a set of
human rights instruments relevant to mental disability, and offers specific guidance on the legal standards and procedural protections required in order to
reconcile human rights with involuntary psychiatric
interventions. The guidance ranges from substantive
criteria for involuntary hospitalization, to rights to
independent review, to a range of other entitlements
and protections featured in the dedicated mental
health laws of many nations. As context, in 2010, onethird of nations lacked such dedicated mental health
51
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laws, the majority being low-income nations58 (though
it may be noted that many of these also have little in
the way of psychiatric infrastructure).59
But are involuntary psychiatric interventions (ever)
consistent with human rights?60 This section has
noted tensions between subjective as well as culturally-variegated perspectives on mental disability, and
an approach, reflected in the WHO literature, that
gives exclusive authority to professional knowledge
— particularly with respect to prevalence and global
burdening. The continued privileging of professional
perspectives along with liberty-constraining legal
frameworks in WHO mental health policy — or the
continued preservation of these frameworks from
culturally and politically informed deliberative reassessment — risks reinforcing the skeptical critique
that, despite the best of intentions, both global mental health policy and the international human rights
model to which it has recently been wedded are liable
to function less to enhance human well-being within a
framework of respect for diversity than to expand professional power along with the global capitalist/pharmaceutical markets within which professional power
is inscribed. In what follows, I examine one (albeit
partial) response to the skeptical critique, namely
that the nexus of human rights and mental health
policy made possible in the wake of the CRPD offers
opportunities to forge new, more inclusive forums for
re-conceptualizing the ideals of both human rights
and mental health. But first, let us further unpack the
premises implicit in the idea of taking a human rights
approach to mental disability.

II. Human Rights and Mental Disability:
Background to the CRPD
The roots of a human rights approach to disability —
or the human rights approach that informs the CRPD
— may be traced to what has been termed the “social
model” of disability. The central ideas are present in
the following statement advanced in the early 1970s
by members of the U.K. movement, Union of the
Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS):
[I]t is society which disables physically impaired
people. Disability is something imposed on top
of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society.61
This description of (physical) disability as arising
through the interaction of individual impairments
and social environments was pitched in opposition to
what has been termed the medical model of disability, wherein disability is conceptualized as a form of
52

individual dysfunction and the means of ameliorating
disability are understood to lie primarily or exclusively
within the knowledge of medical professionals.62 As
such, the social model marks an effort to wrest disability policy from the dual dominance of medical and
charity-based frameworks and to position it as a matter of politics.63
The social model has exercised a formative influence on disability advocacy and the field of critical
disability studies, even as it has attracted controversy
— for instance, concerning the relative primacy of historical-materialist critique (aimed at capitalist market systems and attendant distributive inequalities as
they affect persons with disabilities) versus postmodern critique (addressing the discursive construction
of both disability and impairment).64 Further controversy has arisen around the implications of the social
model for psychosocial disability; e.g., whether mental health conditions are properly described either
as socially produced or as “disabilities.”65 Yet as Judi
Chamberlain and others have demonstrated, persons
with psychosocial disabilities have travelled long roads
of political advocacy66 in order to achieve recognition as central actors within the disability movement,
asserting critiques of social-systemic oppression with
particular force.67
This returns us to the question: what have human
rights to do with disability, and in particular with psychosocial disability? From the historical-materialist
side of disability activism comes a strong tradition of
suspicion of human rights, rooted in the concern that
the liberal-individualist assumptions in which rights
are steeped will necessarily undermine more radical
socialist programs of dismantling the normative and
institutional underpinnings of personal property and
capitalist market systems regarded as at least partly
constitutive of disability-based oppression. Even so,
human rights discourse has proven to be a powerful
mechanism for linking critiques based in the social
model of disability to claims immediately cognizable
in politics and in law.
The emergence of human rights-based reasoning
in the critique of psychosocial disability has followed
its own unique path. Beginning in the 1960s and 70s,
political agitation regarding the treatment of persons
with psychosocial disabilities was predominately libertarian in flavor, centered as it was upon freedom
from unwanted psychiatric interventions. 68 This
form of political critique was fostered in great part
through processes of consciousness-raising within the
anti-psychiatry movement. Through testimonials of
intense physical and psychological suffering brought
on by forced psychiatric treatment,69 typically tracing
a path through suffering to anger and then on to social
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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and political insight and activism, this movement has
done much to root the critique of state-sanctioned
psychiatric power in the right to liberty, conceived
as the right to be left alone. At the same time, antipsychiatry has served a community-building function
among the socially and ideologically diverse collectivity of persons identifying as psychiatric survivors.70
Today, anti-psychiatry continues to denounce involuntary or coercive psychiatric interventions as fundamental infringements of liberty; however, the human

lence, including systemic sexual violence and punitive
or managerial uses of restraint and seclusion, to subjection to appalling institutional conditions, including
extreme heat or cold and unsanitary facilities endangering life and health.75 Nor could these instruments
apparently reach beyond custodial institutions to
assist persons subjected to familial uses of restraint or
seclusion76 or to capricious dissolution of the capacity
to exercise basic legal rights.77 Similar critiques were
made of international policy statements concerning

Despite a few rare victories reflecting the extraordinary efforts
of individuals and advocacy groups, none of the international human rights
instruments preceding the CRPD had succeeded in grounding systemic
reforms broadly supportive of inclusion and equal citizenship among
persons with either psychosocial or intellectual disabilities. All this
arguably added credence to the skeptical claim that human rights, and
particularly international human rights, are but hollow promises perhaps
assisting in the work of political posturing among nations but doing
little or nothing to improve the lives of persons with disabilities and
in particular those with psychosocial or intellectual disabilities.
rights analysis adopted is increasingly grounded not
simply in negative freedom but in a broader set of positive rights. Increasingly, that is, the grassroots-based
human rights approach to mental or psychosocial disability, like the human rights approach to disability
more generally, has come to draw upon a social model
of disability in order to identify inequitable distributions of social burdens and benefits as both disabling
and as legal wrongs.
The comprehensive critiques advanced in the name
of anti-psychiatry have for the most part been marginalized within mainstream mental health policymaking processes, domestic and international. A
similar marginalization may be said to have occurred
with respect to the efforts of human rights advocacy
organizations over the years to systematically document abuses occurring in and beyond mental health
facilities and social care homes.71 Perhaps most disappointingly, as various commentators have noted,
the international human rights instruments in place
prior to the CRPD appear to have been incapable of
grounding any significant or comprehensive challenges to the range of harms historically identified.72
International instruments of general application 73
were rarely if ever applied to sanction the egregious
harms documented within institutions74 — from vioglobal health and the law • spring 2013

the human rights of persons with mental disabilities,
here additionally targeting the weak normative force
of these instruments78 and, in some instances (as with
the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental
Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care),
their giving wide berth to medical discretion regarding involuntary interventions.79 The latter critique has
been directed also to regional human rights instruments (in particular, Art. 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights),80 although commentators
have recognized a few important examples of vindication of the human rights of persons with psychosocial
disabilities under the regional instruments.81 To these
substantive criticisms may be added concerns about
the lack of participation of persons with disabilities in
the processes leading to the international and regional
human rights instruments preceding the CRPD.82 In
sum, despite a few rare victories reflecting the extraordinary efforts of individuals and advocacy groups,83
none of the international human rights instruments
preceding the CRPD had succeeded in grounding
systemic reforms broadly supportive of inclusion and
equal citizenship among persons with either psychosocial or intellectual disabilities.84 All this arguably
added credence to the skeptical claim that human
rights, and particularly international human rights,
53
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are but hollow promises perhaps assisting in the work
of political posturing among nations but doing little
or nothing to improve the lives of persons with disabilities and in particular those with psychosocial or
intellectual disabilities.

III. The CRPD — Process and Substance
The Process
The processes of advocacy and negotiation leading
to the CRPD’s adoption at the UN in 2007 and its
coming into force in 2008 have been described by a
number of commentators, some of whom were active
participants.85 In its first session, the ad hoc UN committee charged with overseeing negotiations decided
that NGOs, including disabled persons and their representatives, should be extended significant rights of
participation in the process.86 The depth of that commitment was indicated in a subsequent decision that
the working group charged with producing a draft
text to orient the negotiations should include twelve
NGOs, in addition to twenty-seven government representatives and one national human rights body.87 The
twelve selected included seven international and five
regional DPOs.88 One of these was the World Network
of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry [WNUSP], 89
which throughout the negotiations took a leadership role in advocating for persons with psychosocial
disabilities.
Following the working group process, the negotiations leading to the final text again featured unprecedented civil society (mainly DPO) participation.90
This included novel opportunities for commentary in
the course of formal plenaries as well as participation
at side events.91 The roster of participants in the sixth
session of the ad hoc committee featured over sixty
DPOs, each of which was represented by delegates
ranging from one to over thirty in number.92 Recognition of the potential for fragmentation and dilution of
DPO perspectives led to the formation of the International Disability Caucus [IDC]:93 a group of DPOs
and supporting NGOs that made behind-the-scenes
efforts to forge consensus on key issues and that strategically intervened throughout the negotiations by
way of oral and written advocacy. Beyond WNUSP,
members of the IDC representing persons with psychosocial disabilities included Support Coalition
International (since renamed MindFreedom International) and the European Network of (ex-) Users
and Survivors of Psychiatry (ENUSP).94 Representing
persons with intellectual disabilities and their families
were the Canadian Association for Community Living95 and Inclusion International.96 These and other
former members of the IDC have continued to vigorously air the perspectives advanced in the negotiations
54

in order to inform the interpretation and implementation of the CRPD.
John McCarthy, founder of Mad Pride Ireland and
representative of MindFreedom International at the
negotiations, described an incident that captures the
energy and sense of having infiltrated the very center
of power that many DPO delegates must have felt, in
addition to a profound sense of responsibility toward
those still languishing at the capillaries of power.
Having accepted an invitation to sit at a national delegate’s table, McCarthy took the opportunity to stage a
moment of political theatre:
Maradonna then offered me a place at his countries desk, I really did not understand the implications of this until I told my fellow delegates,
and the excitement was something to see. I am
very proud to say I did make a statement from
the floor and that I then shuffled around that
enormous chamber to show those delegates the
reality of over medication. Have you any idea
how embarrassing it is to shuffle like I did, and
see the faces of those delegates as I passed in
front of each countries desk all 196 of them,
some with looks of sympathy and understanding
others with looks of anger at this breach of protocol. But I kept Helens face to the forefront of
my mind as the tears welled up at the back of my
eyes and I finished the circuit as the business of
the convention carried on. The point was made.97
The Content
The CRPD does not define disability.98 However, it
articulates a commitment to the social model in a preambular statement that recognizes
that disability results from the interaction
between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders
their full and effective participation in society on
an equal basis with others.99
In distinguishing “disability” from “impairment,” the
tensions within the social model are reproduced. 100
Yet the emphasis on inclusion conveyed in this interactive conception of disability is what nonetheless
underlies and informs the whole of the CRPD, in
particular the normative commitments expressed in
the rest of the preamble, the purposes and definitions
(Arts 1 & 2), and the general principles stated in Articles 3-9. In these sections, the central principle that
persons with disabilities are entitled to equal enjoyment of human rights is elaborated through statements affirming that the coordinate values of equality,
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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autonomy, and respect for difference ground rights to
dedicated social and economic supports and participatory opportunities.101
The substantive rights articulated in Articles
10-30102 include familiar civil and political rights, such
as the right to physical and mental integrity (Art 17),
freedom of expression and opinion (Art 21), and the
right to vote (Art 29). Yet the CRPD elaborates upon
the implications of these rights for persons with disabilities in a manner that brings positive state obligations to the fore.103 In addition, the CRPD articulates
distinct economic, social, and cultural rights — for
instance, the right to education (Art 24), the right to
“the highest standard of health without discrimination
on the basis of disability” (Art 25), the right to work

In sum, the CRPD’s substantive guarantees affirm
the fundamental interrelationship of civil and political with economic, social, and cultural rights, and of
both these traditionally distinct classes of right with
participatory rights.104 It is important to note in particular the vital function of the right to (and duty of
states parties to support) political participation under
this comprehensive human rights scheme. That is,
the guarantee of political participation is essential to
ensure that the fundamental public values of equality and autonomy — along with the whole set of civil
and political, and economic, social, and cultural rights
— are given specificity in a manner that reflects the
perspectives and aspirations of a pluralistic citizenry,
including in particular persons with disabilities.

In sum, the CRPD’s substantive guarantees affirm the fundamental
interrelationship of civil and political with economic, social, and cultural
rights, and of both these traditionally distinct classes of right with
participatory rights. It is important to note in particular the vital function
of the right to (and duty of states parties to support) political participation
under this comprehensive human rights scheme. That is, the guarantee of
political participation is essential to ensure that the fundamental public
values of equality and autonomy — along with the whole set of civil and
political, and economic, social, and cultural rights — are given specificity
in a manner that reflects the perspectives and aspirations of a pluralistic
citizenry, including in particular persons with disabilities.
(Art 27), and the right to “an adequate standard of living,” including “adequate food, clothing and housing”
(Art 28). Article 19 guarantees a right to independent
living and inclusion in the community, complemented
by state duties to provide “residential and other community support services, including personal assistance
necessary to support” the exercise of this right.
Rights to political participation are additionally
acknowledged — first, through a general guarantee
of “[f ]ull and effective participation and inclusion in
society” (Art 3(c)). That guarantee gains specificity in
Article 4(3), which requires that states parties actively
involve persons with disabilities in decision-making
about the laws and policies affecting them, including
decisions regarding implementation of the CRPD.
Moreover, Article 29 provides a right to “participation
in political and public life,” and places a duty on states
to “encourage” the participation of disabled persons in
political parties, NGOs and specifically DPOs.

global health and the law • spring 2013

It is important to note in addition the CRPD’s extensive implementation mechanisms.105 These include a
mechanism now common among international human
rights conventions: that of instituting a committee to
oversee international implementation (Art 34).106 Like
other such bodies, the CRPD committee is to receive
and respond to the compliance reports of states parties (Art 36). Also familiar from precedent conventions
is the committee’s authority to make general observations on the convention’s implementation in the
course of reporting to the General Assembly and the
Economic and Social Council (Art 39). The committee is further vested with authority, under the Optional
Protocol, to hear individual complaints relating to signatories of that instrument (Art 1 OP)107 and to initiate
inquiries into “grave or systematic violations” of CRPD
rights among the signatories (Art 6 OP).
Also relevant to implementation are obligations of
states parties which reach beyond the core obligation
to bring domestic law and practice into conformity
55
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with the convention (Art 4(1)(b)). These include the
duty to submit compliance reports (Art 35) — supplemented, in the CRPD, by a duty to widely distribute
those reports and the committee’s responses (Art
36(4)).108 Additionally, states parties must designate
one or more focal points to take responsibility “for
matters relating to the implementation” of the Convention (Art 33(1)), and must give “due consideration”
to effecting a “coordination mechanism” for integrating the implementation-related activities of different
levels or departments of government (33(1)). 109 As
or more important is the obligation to vest an independent body with responsibility “to promote, protect
and monitor implementation” (Art 33(2)),110 so as to
ensure that non-compliant laws, policies or practices
are identified and actively challenged domestically.111
The same section states an expectation that “[c]ivil
society, in particular persons with disabilities and
their representative organizations, shall be involved
and participate fully in the monitoring process” (Art
33(3)).
Article 31 requires states parties to “collect appropriate information, including statistical and research
data, to enable them to formulate and implement
policies to give effect to” the convention. This provision does not specify a duty to consult with disabled
persons in designing data-collection policies or instruments (the importance of which was discussed in
Part I herein).112 It does impose obligations to comply with relevant international human rights norms,
including those concerning protection of privacy and
confidentiality (31(1)(a)&(b)), and to share the data
with disabled persons and others (31(3)). Finally,
Article 32 imposes duties of international cooperation, including an obligation on states parties to work
with international, regional and civil society organizations, including DPOs, to facilitate “capacity-building,
including through the exchange and sharing of information, experiences, training programmes and best
practices.”113

IV. Two Controversies
The Expressive Function of Human Rights114
Two debates of particular relevance to persons with
psychosocial disabilities arose during CRPD negotiations. These concerned the legitimacy of involuntary
psychiatric interventions and, separately, the legitimacy of substitute decision-making. Both debates
were pressed to the point of negotiation impasse and
then resolved by way of textual silence — leaving considerable scope for interpretive controversy in their
wake. This may be regarded as a failing of the negotiations and of the resulting text, effectively undermining the consensus required to generate practi56

cal reforms.115 I argue instead that the controversies
in question illustrate an important positive function
of the CRPD, and of human rights guarantees more
generally: one that Oliver Lewis, drawing upon the
work of Sandra Fredman and others,116 describes in
his work on the CRPD as the “expressive” function
of human rights law. On this account, human rights
law (international or domestic) does not operate on a
simple command and control basis.117 Rather, it creates “a normative framework, a vocabulary and a set
of open concepts to structure normative discussion,”118
along with “institutions and procedures that promote
further discussion.”119 That is, on this account, human
rights norms are best understood as mechanisms
for opening dialogue among authorities and those
subject to authority on central questions concerning
the basic requisites of political legitimacy. This promotes mutual education, and ultimately, action, the
transformative potential of which rests in the value of
“encouraging actors to rethink assumptions, evaluate
positions and shift existing concepts or paradigms.”120
Viewed in this light, the debates described below
illustrate the depth of the challenges and opportunities introduced by the CRPD for global mental health
policy.
The Legitimacy of Involuntary Psychiatric
Hospitalization and Treatment
The first controversy is rooted in Article 14, and also
17 (other provisions, including Article 19, are implicated as well).121 Article 14(1)(a) requires states parties
to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the right
to liberty and security of the person on an equal basis
with others. Under Article 14(1)(b), states must ensure
that persons with disabilities are not “deprived of their
liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and that any deprivation of liberty is in conformity with the law, and that
the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a
deprivation of liberty.”
It is the final clause that was the focus of debate
at the negotiations. Some states delegates sought to
revise the draft text to specify that deprivation of liberty should not be based “solely” or “exclusively” on
disability.122 Their intent was to affirm the legitimacy
of laws grounding involuntary hospitalization not on
mental disorder alone, but rather on mental disorder
plus other criteria, such as risk of serious harm to self
or others or risk of serious physical or psychological
deterioration.123 Mexico and Thailand raised the concern that positioning disability among multiple factors to be relied upon in restricting liberty is itself a
form of disability-based discrimination.124 The next
day, IDC representatives endorsed this critique and
registered their support for the original Working
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Group text.125 Ultimately, the proposed qualifications
aimed at explicitly condoning involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization were rejected.
Relatedly, Article 17 (the right to “physical and psychological integrity”) was at one point the subject of
proposed textual amendments in an effort to specify
legal safeguards proper to involuntary psychiatric
interventions. This proposal was rejected as well, consistent with the position of the IDC,126 making Article
17 noteworthy for its relative lack of elaboration in
comparison with other sections of the CRPD.127 At
the negotiations, the IDC made clear its concern that
this right not be qualified or circumscribed in a manner that singles out persons with disabilities.128 Some
commentators have since argued that Article 17 stands
as a missed opportunity to have mandated procedural
and substantive protections often disregarded in state
laws and practices concerning involuntary hospitalization.129 In any case, the failure of the text to advert to
involuntary hospitalization has facilitated competing
interpretations as to whether Article 17 strictly prohibits involuntary psychiatric interventions or merely
fails to state (but does not preclude) a range of conditions under which such interventions are permitted.130
Let us explore further the IDC’s position that laws
permitting involuntary psychiatric interventions are
necessarily inconsistent with Articles 14 and 17, read
in light of the wider values of the CRPD.131 That position is at its base rooted in the fairly uncontroversial
thesis that the liberal rights-guarantees of liberty and
physical/psychological integrity encompass not only
freedom from arbitrary incarceration but also freedom from arbitrary, unwanted state-sanctioned interventions. The question is what counts as “arbitrary,”
or on what if any basis these guarantees may be justifiably circumscribed. There is significant consensus
among rights-respecting constitutional democracies
that anticipated risk should not in itself be a basis
for restricting liberty, either in health care settings
or in the ordinary exercise of criminal law powers.132
Is there, then, any reasonable basis for singling out
persons with mental health conditions for libertyrestricting or intrusive interventions based in apprehended risk? Here it is salient that persons without
mental health diagnoses may, for instance, neglect
medical advice so as to jeopardize their own health
(sometimes on bases that others deem irrational), or
may present risk factors more predictive of dangerousness than is a psychiatric diagnosis.133 In this way,
assertions based in the inviolability of liberty and personal integrity may be supplemented by the equalitybased concern that regimes of involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization and treatment arbitrarily single out
some persons for disproportionate burdening, based
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in stereotypical assumptions equating mental health
diagnoses with dangerousness and/or incapacity.134
As Tina Minkowitz has suggested, a further twist to
the argument is provided by Article 19’s guarantee
of a right to inclusion in the community,135 such that
any attempted justification of involuntary psychiatric interventions must contend with the CRPD-based
claim that the state has not met its supportive obligations in this respect.
Predictably, this is not a position that has impressed
governments otherwise inclined to defend their mental health regimes as at the cutting edge of human
rights-regarding policy. Australia, for one, has registered an interpretive declaration/reservation asserting its view that the CRPD permits involuntary hospitalization and treatment in accordance with that
country’s mental health laws.136 In contrast, the UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) tersely stated, in 2009, that Article 14 of
the CRPD requires that “legislation authorizing the
institutionalization of persons with disabilities on the
grounds of disability without their free and informed
consent must be abolished.”137 This pronouncement
was expressly stated to include “situations where the
deprivation of liberty is grounded in the combination between a mental or intellectual disability and
other elements such as dangerousness, or care and
treatment.”138 Recently, the CRPD Committee too has
stated its position that laws authorizing involuntary
institutionalization or treatment on the basis of mental disability are non-compliant with the CRPD.139
These developments suggest that the abolitionist
position relayed by DPOs at the CRPD negotiations
has met with an unprecedented level of success on
the international stage — at least, in theory. Here it
is important to emphasize that the IDC arguments
against coercive laws and practices were complemented by arguments that states must provide accessible alternatives in the form of voluntary supports. Yet
it should be noted that, were the abolitionist position
indeed to be taken seriously in processes of domestic
law reform, there is potentially another, more conservative sort of reform that might be crafted in response.
This would be to replace existing involuntary psychiatric hospitalization laws based in mental health
status and risk with mental capacity laws, grounded
in a functional standard of decision-making capacity
applicable to all persons and across a range of decisions.140 Such legislation might be argued to respect
(formal) equality, as well as the justificatory principle of the least restrictive intervention, in taking a
decision-specific, functional rather than status-based
approach to legal incapacity.141 And yet the approach
has the potential to facilitate more and earlier invol57
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untary psychiatric interventions than laws based in
mental health status and risk.142 This brings us to the
heart of the second CRPD-related controversy I wish
to explore herein, on the legitimacy of the status of
legal incapacity and attendant regimes of substitute
decision-making.
Article 12 — Equal Legal Capacity
The second controversy concerns Article 12. Article
12(1) provides: “States Parties reaffirm that persons
with disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law.” Article 12(2) shifts
from the concept of legal personhood to that of legal
capacity: “States Parties shall recognize that persons
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis
with others in all aspects of life.” Article 12(3) then
provides: “States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to
the support they may require in exercising their legal
capacity.” Two further subsections address legal safeguards that are to accompany “measures relating to
the exercise of legal capacity.”143
Here it is important to have in mind how existing
laws typically articulate legal capacity. Some laws provide for total/plenary guardianship, whereby guardians are conferred broad decision-making authority
over a person’s personal or financial affairs or both.144
An alternative sort of law contemplates more circumscribed forms of substitute decision-making,
restricted to a particular decision or type of decision.145 The standards for determining legal capacity vary among jurisdictions and among intra-jurisdictional statutory and common law regimes. Some
standards are status-based; for instance, conditioning incapacity solely upon age (in the case of minors)
or disability (sometimes stated in vague terms, e.g.,
“unsound mind” or “infirmity of the mind”).146 Others
are functional; that is, capacity is assessed in light of
specified decision-making abilities, such as the ability
to “understand” the relevant information and “appreciate” the consequences.147 A further sort of standard is
outcome-based, e.g., contingent upon the “reasonableness” of one’s decision(s).148 Where legal capacity is
displaced in one or more areas of decision-making, the
law typically provides for a regime of substitute decision-making whereby an individual assumes responsibility to make decisions in the best interests of one
deemed incapable, or in an approximation of that person’s capable judgment. Some jurisdictions also offer
alternatives to substitute decision-making, such as codecision-making (whereby a court appoints someone
to share decision-making authority with a person who
requires assistance)149 or supported decision-making
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(whereby one may nominate a person to assist one
with decision-making).150
During the negotiations concerning Article 12,151
some states delegates sought to add to the text a statement explicitly affirming the legitimacy of guardianship or substitute decision-making in appropriate
cases and with appropriate safeguards. Contrastingly,
the IDC took the position that there should be no condoning of guardianship in Article 12 and that the references to safeguards in 12(4) should be understood
to refer to supported decision-making only,152 positing that guardianship, indeed all substitute decisionmaking, is inconsistent with the overarching commitment of the CRPD to disabled persons’ autonomy and
equality. This position was rooted in a critique of the
concept of legal incapacity as irredeemably steeped in
arbitrariness and social prejudice.153
More expansively stated, the IDC’s position on Article 12 was that the section not only grounds an obligation on states to provide appropriate decision-making
supports to persons who encounter difficulty making
decisions, but that it moreover grounds a thoroughgoing shift to a minimalist conception of legal capacity,
based not in adequacy to a cognitivist standard but
rather in the mere expression of (and efforts of others
to discern) one’s will or preference. At times during
the negotiations, the IDC appeared to deny that there
could ever be circumstances in which one might be
unable to exercise legal capacity (as opposed to able,
with the right supports).154 Ultimately, however, the
position advanced was that substitute decision-making may be required in rare instances — the archetypical instance being coma or loss of consciousness
— although these situations, too, demand ongoing,
vigilant supports aimed at encouraging the exercise of
legal capacity.155
So far, this is a skeletal position. An attack is leveled
at the prevailing principles of legal capacity and substitute decision-making but it is not clear what exactly
the alternatives are — not merely what should count
as supports for legal capacity, but more generally, what
it would mean to accept that legal capacity (across the
full range of legal relationships and transactions) is
implicit in the mere expression of individual preference
or will. One may, however, discern even in this skeletal statement of the position an urgent instrumental
rationale.156 That is, at base the position reflects a concern to disrupt existing power relations, and with this,
the deeply-held thesis that existing regimes of legal
incapacity and substitute decision-making function to
suppress or override the values, preferences, and life
projects of persons with disabilities in favor of the values, preferences and life projects of others. To this may
be added the strategic thesis that a legal regime that
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strictly prohibits displacement of individual decisionmaking capacity will likely provide medical and other
authorities with incentives to investigate and fashion
innovative supports for decision-making — communication to a range of other conditions potentially
conducive to deliberation157 — there being no legally

also highly rationalist in orientation. Here the argument begins with the claim (put forward by the IDC
in the course of CRPD negotiations) that persons with
psychosocial disabilities have the same right as others
to make “bad decisions.”160 Typically, the right to make
bad decisions is justified in light of the autonomy-

Personhood (and not reasonableness or rationality) is thus posited as the
source of legal capacity and as the basis on which respect for one’s wishes
is grounded. That said, the minimalist position on the requisites of legal
capacity is not necessarily inconsistent with the thesis that supported
decision-making should seek to enable autonomous (not merely willful)
decisions, encompassing reflection on and reasoning in light of one’s
values in the context of a range of meaningful options.
sanctioned option of force in the face of ill-considered
choices.158 In contrast, regimes of substitute decisionmaking may diminish the perceived importance of
supports, and even provide incentives to remove supports in some circumstances, so as to increase the likelihood of a timely declaration of incapacity and so a
timely medical (or other) intervention.
Beneath such instrumental considerations lie deeper
claims about the meaning of the fundamental human
rights value of individual autonomy. The WNUSP
Implementation Manual for the CRPD states:
Autonomy and self-determination are dependent on having sufficient access to resources so
that economic and social coercion do not lead to
decision-making that does not reflect the person’s own values and feelings. . . Autonomy and
self-determination are also dependent on the
existence of meaningful alternatives related to
the particular decision at issue.159
This is a relational conception of autonomy, centered
upon the thesis that supportive social systems (including access to material resources and a range of meaningful options) are essential to the development and
expression of autonomy. The IDC/WNUSP position
on Article 12 may be understood to transpose the idea
of the relationality of autonomy to the domain of legal
capacity, as such locating capacity not in the individual alone but in the interaction between the individual
and a robust system of supports.
Accompanying this relational conception of autonomy is a further challenge to dominant models of legal
capacity, which tend not only to be individualistic but
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based claim that our lives go better when they are led
from inside — when we are given the opportunity to
learn from our mistakes and moreover preserved from
having to mechanically or inauthentically live out others’ ideas of what is best for us.161 The claim raised by
those challenging existing models of legal capacity and
substitute decision-making, then, is arguably at least
in part that these models suspend the opportunity
to lead one’s life “from inside.” But the deeper claim
is that these models fail to capture what it is about
individual preferences, or more generally about the
human personality, that should ground respect. On
the approach taken by the IDC during CRPD negotiations and by sympathetic exponents of the position
thereafter, what grounds this respect is not our ability
to reason but our status as persons.162 To clarify, the
idea is not simply that this status obliges others to
refrain from doing us harm; it obliges them, moreover,
to respect our preferences, in short our expressions
of aspiration or will, as expressions of legal capacity.
Personhood (and not reasonableness or rationality) is
thus posited as the source of legal capacity and as the
basis on which respect for one’s wishes is grounded.163
That said, the minimalist position on the requisites of
legal capacity is not necessarily inconsistent with the
thesis that supported decision-making should seek
to enable autonomous (not merely willful) decisions,
encompassing reflection on and reasoning in light of
one’s values in the context of a range of meaningful
options.
Critics will be ready with responses to the minimalist conception of legal capacity,164 including examples
in which it would be unconscionable to treat another’s
expression of preference or will as a capable choice; for
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instance, cases in which the person is clearly unable
(despite supports) to understand what is at stake.
Might the minimalist position recognize intention or
will as expressive of legal capacity only where there is
evidence that the person grasps the likely consequences
— particularly if these are dire? But this would probably conflict with the background practical or political commitment to protecting psychiatrized persons
and others from attributions of incapacity based in a
lack of concordance with others’ value-laden assessments of the risks and benefits at stake. Alternatively,
might legal effect be assigned to expressions of intention or will only where some further non-cognitivist
criterion is satisfied; for instance, consistency with the
individual’s “life narrative”?165 And what if any role
might legal doctrines such as fraud, duress, or mistake
have in nullifying the legal effect of an exercise of legal
capacity conceived in minimalist terms? These and
other difficult questions surround the radical yet skeletal positions on Article 12 advanced by DPOs during
and after the CRPD negotiations.
Canada has registered an interpretive declaration/
reservation concerning Article 12, whereby it affirms
the CRPD-consistency of substitute decision-making
“in appropriate circumstances and in accordance
with the law” and reserves the right to maintain such
regimes in the face of contrary interpretations.166 Australia has registered a similar declaration.167 Moreover,
certain other states have maintained the conservative
position they advanced in the negotiations, namely
that “equal legal capacity” refers to “capacity for
rights,” not capacity to act or to exercise one’s rights.168
These positions stand in tension with recent statements from the CRPD committee indicating endorsement of the claims advanced by the IDC. For instance,
the committee’s concluding observations on Spain’s
report state:

and requested submissions on its implementation, in
light of which one may expect a General Comment.171
The above-noted challenges to involuntary hospitalization and substitute decision-making in light of
the CRPD should not be dismissed, as some have suggested, as fantastical extensions of the social model
to the point of denying the phenomenon of impairment.172 Rather, academics and policy makers alike
must take seriously the provocative theoretical as well
as practical claims informing the efforts of DPOs to
shift entrenched relationships of power and coercion
to relationships of support. Ultimately, the arguments
canvassed herein urge states to devote imaginative as
well as financial resources to enabling this shift. The
question of what exactly this would entail173 in law
and in practice requires further inquiry — normative,
conceptual, and empirical.174 Such inquiries may link
up with ongoing efforts to critique dominant conceptions of autonomy in philosophy and bioethics in light
of theses on the social constitution of the self,175 and
explorations of how agency or autonomy may be exercised in the face of systemic oppression.176 Moreover,
they may link up with the growing interest in the specific challenges posed by mental or intellectual disability to philosophical conceptions of “personhood,
agency, responsibility, equality, citizenship, the scope
of justice, and human connection.”177 However, any
such inquiries must carefully attend to the perspectives of persons with psychosocial disabilities as well
as persons with intellectual disabilities, who, through
their interventions in the CRPD negotiation process
and now at the implementation stage, have brought to
global prominence the emancipatory project of shifting mental health policy from its historical fixation on
involuntariness and incapacity toward the relatively
uncharted territory of supports.

The Committee recommends that the State party
review the laws allowing for guardianship and
trusteeship, and take action to develop laws and
policies to replace regimes of substitute decisionmaking by supported decision-making, which
respects the person’s autonomy, will and preferences. It further recommends that training be
provided on this issue for all relevant public officials and other stakeholders.169

WHO discourse on the global burden of mental disability reflects a privileging of professional knowledge to the exclusion of lived experience. However,
the WHO has increasingly come to acknowledge
the importance of promoting human rights as these
intersect with mental health, a project that necessarily requires attention to the social context as well as
subjective experience of mental disability. This shift
in attention is accompanied by new global development initiatives aimed at promoting mental health
by reducing poverty and discrimination. However,
tensions between professional and first-person perspectives have resurfaced under the CRPD, as DPOs
advance positions that “go to the very heart”178 of mental health laws and policies widely accepted among

Some may take this to indicate that states should prioritize supportive decision-making, leaving substitute
decision-making as a last resort — an interpretation
that does not require abolishment of the latter regimes.
But such interpretations are uncertain.170 The CRPD
Committee has held discussions concerning Article 12
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nations and indeed promulgated by the WHO as a
model for all nations.
Given the depth of the challenges raised to mental health law and policy by DPOs, there is a risk
that they (or their most radical claims) may be shut
out of domestic and international mental health policy development efforts or pressed to the margins of
those efforts.179 But this would conflict with the CRPD
imperative of enhancing the political participation of
persons with disabilities, domestically and internationally. It would also conflict with the imperatives
of global mental health policy, not only because such
policies should be concordant with the CRPD, but
also because the increasingly organized and politically
engaged cadre of DPOs presents an important source
of expertise for informing policy development. The
question is how to initiate and sustain inclusive and
mutually educative policy deliberations, and avoid the
retrenchment of historical polarization and exclusion.
A further question as CRPD implementation unfolds
is how DPOs may enrich and protect their claims to
representativeness, and moreover, their independence, in an environment saturated with pharmaceutical industry presence extending to deployment of
disease-based advocacy groups as lobbying and marketing tools.180
There is, however, also reason to be optimistic about
the prospects for inclusive efforts at mutual capacitybuilding regarding CRPD rights. Commitment to
CRPD implementation has been demonstrated in a
number of ways in recent years.181 This includes efforts
within and across UN agencies to identify implications of the Convention that cut across their respective mandates,182 and on the part of states parties to
effect CRPD-compliant reforms including the introduction of anti-discrimination laws and accommodation policies.183 Moreover, DPOs have been intensely
active on the implementation front — in part, the
result of new funding opportunities in the wake of the
CRPD.184 These activities have included participation
in international forums on CRPD implementation
alongside governments and other representatives of
civil society185 and intensive efforts to forge relationships of mutual support with other DPOs and NGOs,
for instance in the areas of human rights monitoring
and shadow reporting.186
Continued efforts toward inclusive policy deliberations should not neglect the areas of controversy discussed herein. Reports prepared for the WHO and
World Bank187 have recognized the importance of promoting supported decision-making. These agencies
are in a position to foster broad-based inquiry into the
social supports required to assist decision-making and
moreover to promote the development and expresglobal health and the law • spring 2013

sion of autonomy and active citizenship. Such efforts
should include particular attention to the perspectives
of persons with psychosocial disabilities and also those
with intellectual disabilities188 — including persons
with direct experience of capacity determination or
coercive interventions189 — across different cultural,
social, and national locations and across intersecting
categories of discrimination including race, gender,
and age.190
This paper might have dwelled further on the suffering that may accompany mental disability and
the propensity of human rights to assist in easing
such suffering. Certainly the CRPD articulates commitments supportive of such an analysis. Instead, I
have focused on the function of the CRPD in opening new global conversations about what it means to
promote human rights in relation to mental health,
within a framework that recognizes the complexity of
this aspect of human diversity. The unique role taken
by DPOs in the drafting and now implementation of
the CRPD reminds us of the possibility for human
rights to disrupt dominant assumptions and power
relations, including those that have calcified around
global mental health policy. Going forward, the interaction of global mental health policy and the CRPD
— by way of the many social actors brought together
through these political mechanisms — will continue
to pose challenges running deeper even than the challenge of improving global mental health outcomes or
reducing concomitant burdens. As I have suggested
herein, these challenges reach to the meaning and
practical implications of the human rights values of
equality, autonomy, and political participation — or
the relevance of these fundamental values to our collective efforts to support individual and social wellbeing in and beyond the policy domain of mental
health.
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Reforming Mental Disability Law in Africa: Practical Tips
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Regarding the Consideration of the Third Periodic Report of
Bulgaria 102nd session (11 -29 July 2011), Geneva, at 22-24
[hereinafter Bulgarian Helsinki Committee Submission 2011],
available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/
docs/ngo/BHC_Bulgaria_HRC102.pdf> (last visited February
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Moore v. The Gambia, Communication No. 241/2000 (2003),
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in formal plenary sessions in the afternoons.
92.	See “List of NGO Representatives Registered for the Sixth
Session,” available at <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/
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109.	Oliver Lewis elucidates the importance of this aspect of the
convention, describing it as an “audacious constitutional masterstroke,” id., at 124.
110.	
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February 4, 2013).
114.	Various human rights scholars have commented upon the
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supra note 114, at 33.
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Communicative Functions of Law,” supra note 114, at 41.
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P. Weller, eds., Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws
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“Abolishing Mental Health Laws to Comply with the CRPD”].
On the scope of Article 15, see also “The Anti-Torture Framework,” supra note 71.
122.	See the notes from the Fifth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee (January 26, 2005 – afternoon), available at <http://
www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc5sum26jan.htm>
(last visited February 4, 2013).
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Uganda in the notes from January 26, 2005, id.
124.	See the comments from the representatives of Mexico and
Thailand in the notes from January 26, 2005, id.
125.	See the comments from representatives of the IDC in the
notes of discussions at the Fifth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee from Jan 27 2005, available at <http://www.un.org/
esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc5sum27jan.htm> (last visited
February 4, 2013): “It was said yesterday that disability itself
is not a justification for deprivation of liberty, but together
with something else disability can be a basis of deprivation of
liberty. Any adjective and addition to this paragraph such as
‘solely’ or ‘exclusively’ based on disability is a threat to human
rights.”
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126.	See “Abolishing Mental Health Laws to Comply with the
CRPD,” supra note 121, at 412-413; “Out of Darkness into
Light?” supra note 34, at 30.
127.	However, the importance of this Article should not be diminished. Kayess and French note that this is “the first time the
concept of ‘integrity of the person’ has been included as a
standalone Article in a core United Nations human rights
treaty.” See supra note 34, at 29. See also the discussion of
Article 17 in B. McSherry, “Protecting the Integrity of the Person: Developing Limitations on Involuntary Treatment,” in B.
McSherry, ed., International Trends in Mental Health Laws
(Annandale: Federation Press, 2008): Special edition Volume
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(last visited February 4, 2013).
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due process protection in many parts of the world.” (See “The
Anti-Torture Framwework,” supra note 71, at 55.) The point
is also made by Kayess and French, supra note 34, at 30:
“The IDC and WNUSP sought the ultimate goal of the CRPD
‘outlawing’ all forms of compulsory assistance, but, when this
proved impossible to achieve, they adopted the alternative
lobbying stance that there ought to be no reference to compulsory treatment in the CRPD as this would provide it with
legitimacy. Ultimately, this was the outcome of the Ad Hoc
Committee’s deliberations, although this appeared to be more
to avoid conflict with the IDC and WNUSP, than because of
any underlying commitment to the principle on which this
opposition was based. The result is that one of the most critical areas of human rights violation for persons with disability
– the use of coercive State power for the purpose of ‘treatment’ – remains without any specific regulation.”
130.	Terry Carney makes the point that “neither silence nor ambiguous drafting displaces prior explicit language in previous
international instruments”: “Guardianship, ‘Social’ Citizenship and Theorizing Substitute Decision-Making Law,” in I.
Doron and A. Sodon, eds., Beyond Elder Law: New Directions
in Law and Aging (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2012):1-17, at 5,
footnote 6 (hereinafter cited as “Guardianship, ‘Social’ Citizenship and Theorizing Substitute Decision-Making Law”).
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131.	See “Abolishing Mental Health Laws to Comply with the
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133.	See “A Preference for Liberty,” id., at 93-98. On the lack of correlation of most mental disorders (including schizophrenia)
with increased risk of violent behavior, absent other factors
such as substance abuse, see J. Monahan et al., Rethinking
Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder
and Violence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
134.	See Kaiser, “Redirecting the Ship of State,” supra note 61,
at 154 (“People subject to mental health law are too readily
depicted as being incapable of making decisions and dangerous to themselves or others owing to their supposed individual pathologies”). WNUSP argued (successfully) for specific mention of informed consent as an aspect of the right to
health. See the report of WNUSP commentary at the 6th session, August 8, 2005, available at <http://www.un.org/esa/
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135.	“Abolishing Mental Health Laws to Comply with the CRPD”
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disabilities should not be subject to involuntary hospitalization but, rather, should be offered supports to enable community inclusion. WNUSP makes the further point that access
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and mental integrity on an equal basis with others. Australia
further declares its understanding that the Convention allows
for compulsory assistance or treatment of persons, including
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137.	
Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
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Articles 14 and 15 of the CRPD. (Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, July 28, 2008, UN Doc
A/63/175, at para. 44).
139.	See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under
Article 35 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Tunisia), CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1, 5th sess. (May 13, 2011) para. 25
(recommending that Tunisia “repeal legislative provisions
which allow for the deprivation of liberty on the basis of disability, including a psychosocial or intellectual disability”).
And see Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under
Article 35 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Spain),
CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1, 6th sess. (October 19, 2011), para. 36
(stating that Spain must “repeal provisions that authorize
involuntary internment linked to an apparent or diagnosed
disability; and adopt measures to ensure that health-care services, including all mental-health-care services, are based on
the informed consent of the person concerned”).
140.	See J. Dawson and G. Szmukler, “Fusion of Mental Health
and Incapacity Legislation,” British Journal of Psychiatry 188
(2006): 505-509.
141.	
Id.
142.	Id., at 505: “This […] might permit earlier intervention, in
both physical and mental illness, because intervention would
be authorised as soon as the patient lacked capacity to determine treatment, whether or not there was an imminent threat
of harm. That approach is likely to find support with many
patients’ families.”
143.	Under Article 12(4), states parties must ensure “that all
measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity provide
for appropriate and effective safeguards,” specifically requiring “that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity
respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free
of conflict of interest and undue influence, are proportional
and tailored to the person’s circumstances, apply for the
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shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a
competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial
body.” Additionally, “The safeguards shall be proportional to
the degree to which such measures affect the person’s rights
and interests.”
	 Article 12(5) provides: “Subject to the provisions of this
article, States Parties shall take all appropriate and effective
measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their own financial
affairs and to have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and
other forms of financial credit, and shall ensure that persons
with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their property.”
144.	See for instance my home jurisdiction’s guardianship statute,
Nova Scotia’s Incompetent Persons Act, RSNS 1989, c 218.
145.	See for instance Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO
1996, c 2, Sch A, and Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, SO 1992,
c 30.
146.	For discussion of this and the other types of existing legal
capacity standards, see “Legal Capacity in the Disability
Rights Convention,” supra note 85, at 431-433.
147.	Again see Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act, supra note 145,
at s. 4(1). These (and other) common legal criteria informed
the design of the influential clinical model of Appelbaum
and Grisso, the MacCAT-T (consisting of four parameters:
the ability to understand relevant information; the ability to
reason about options; the ability to appreciate one’s situation
and the consequences of the choice; and the ability to express
a choice.) See P. T. Grisso et al., “The MacCAT-T: A Clinical
Tool to Assess Patients’ Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions,” Psychiatric Services 48, no. 11 (1997): 1415-1419.
148.	See “Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention,”
supra note 85, at 431-433 (discussing this and the other conventional standards for assigning legal [in]capacity). This
standard might also describe an illicit capacity assessment
practice (i.e., substituting an outcome-based standard in
practice where a functional standard is formally required).
149.	See Saskatchewan’s The Adult Guardianship and Co-decisionmaking Act, SS 2000, c A-5.3, ss. 14(1)(a), 15, 16(1), 17(1)&(2).
150.	See British Columbia’s Representation Agreement Act, RSBC
1996, c 405. Under this statute, a person may appoint someone to help one make decisions, or to make decisions on one’s
behalf (s. 7). Capacity to make a representation agreement is
adjudged on a different, more flexible standard than other
forms of legal capacity (s. 8). However, this is not a comprehensive alternative to traditional forms of legal incapacity
and substitute decision-making; B.C. also features more traditional guardianship and substitute decision-making laws.
Moreover, under s.11, a representative cannot refuse involuntary psychiatric hospitalization and treatment authorized
under the province’s Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288.
151.	The negotiations concerning Article 12 are explored in detail
by Amita Dhanda in “Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights
Convention,” supra note 85.
152.	See “Abolishing Mental Health Laws,” supra note 121, at 160.
153.	See the daily summary from January 27, 2005 (Fifth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee): “The International Disability Caucus (IDC) emphasized the need to address the legal
capacity issue in the context of history. PWD [Persons with
disabilities] have, over centuries, been perceived as lacking
capacity. The notion of disqualification persists in existing
legal norms across jurisdictions and is a result of social prejudices,” available at <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/
rights/ahc5sum27jan.htm> (last visited February 4, 2013).
154.	The daily summary from January 18, 2006 (7th session of
the Ad Hoc Committee) reflects an exchange between the
discussion facilitator and an IDC representative, in which
the facilitator asks if guardianship has any place in the model
endorsed by IDC. The response is recorded as: “The IDC goal
is to not legitimize guardianship. The point is that a need for
100% support will become 99% and then 98% if we are talking about supported decision making and this would not be
possible in a guardianship situation,” available at <http://
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www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7sum17jan.htm>
(last visited February 4, 2013).
155.	The IDC’s “Explanatory Note on Legal Capacity and Forced
Interventions,” available at <www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/
rights/ahc8contngos.htm> [last visited February 4, 2013])
states: “The support model acknowledges that there are
times when other people make decisions for us, such as when
a person is unconscious. Support continues to be provided to
encourage the person to begin exercising legal capacity, while
urgent needs are taken care of.” See also T. Minkowitz, “Abolishing Mental Health Laws,” supra note 121, at 157-58.
156.	See “Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention,”
supra note 85, at 444-446.
157.	Exploration of the conditions that may support decisionmaking are proliferating in the wake of the CRPD. See,
e.g., M. Bach and L. Kerzner, A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity, report prepared for the Law Commission of Ontario, October 2010, at
72-82 [hereinafter cited as A New Paradigm for Protecting
Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity]; S. McDaid and
S. Delaney, “A Social Approach to Decision-Making Capacity:
Exploratory Research with People with Experience of Mental Health Treatment,” Disability & Society 26, no. 6 (2011):
729-742 [hereinafter cited as “A Social Approach to DecisionMaking Capacity”]; T. Minkowitz, “Abolishing Mental Health
Laws to Comply with the CRPD,” supra note 121, at 160-166;
S. Wildeman,“Insight Revisited: Relationality and Psychiatric Treatment Decision-Making Capacity,” in J. Downie and
J. Llewellyn, eds., Being Relational: Reflections on Relational
Theory and Health Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011): 255,
at 268-277.
158.	Of course, one practical alternative (contrary to the values of the CRPD) would be to rely on coercive institutional
responses making non-compliance so awful that compliance
is effectively compelled.
159.	WNUSP Implementation Manual for the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Feb
2008), available at <http://www.wnusp.net/documents/
WNUSP_CRPD_Manual.pdf > [last visited March 1, 2013].
Similarly, the IDC is reported to have stated in the negotiations: “Seeking support in exercising legal capacity does not
diminish or negate one’s independence and capacity. Human
interdependence is a fact that should be recognized as a legal
principle.” (Daily summary from January 27, 2005 [Fifth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee], available at <http://www.
un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc5sum27jan.htm> [last
visited February 4, 2013]).
160.	The daily summary of discussions from the Fifth Session of
the Ad Hoc Committee (Feb 3, 2005) reflects the following
statement from an IDC representative: “Non-disabled people
take for granted their right to make bad decisions. PWD [persons with disabilities] deserve the same right,” available at
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc5sum3feb.
htm> (last visited February 4, 2013). See also Koch (Re),
(1997) 33 OR (3d) 485 (Gen. Div.) at 521, cited in Starson v.
Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 722 at para. 76.
161.	This is the “endorsement constraint” propounded by Ronald
Dworkin: the idea that “our lives do not go better when led
from the outside,” even if this means we will make mistakes.
See R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of
Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000):
at 216-18, and W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and
Culture, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989): at 12-13.
162.	Gerard Quinn states that “at the bottom of the debate” about
legal capacity are “conceptions – sometimes competing conceptions – of personhood.” See G. Quinn, “Personhood &
Legal Capacity: Perspectives on the Paradigm Shift of Article
12 CRPD,” paper presented at Conference on Disability and
Legal Capacity under the CRPD, Harvard Law School, Boston, February 20, 2010, at 5-6, available at <www.inclusionireland.ie/documents/HarvardLegalCapacitygqdraft2.doc>
(last visited February 4, 2013).
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163.	Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner (A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity, supra note
157) ground their approach to legal capacity in part in the
capacities of support-persons to interpret expressions of will
in light of a broader understanding of a person’s “life narrative” (at 60-61).
164.	Allen Buchanan and Dan W. Brock argue that the ability to
“express a choice” does not qualify as a standard of decisionmaking capacity at all. A. E. Buchanan and D. W. Brock,
Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): at 49.
But this would appear to be precisely the point of the radical
model: to explode the concept of legal capacity and start fresh
from the idea of mutual supports.
165.	See Bach and Kerzner, in A New Paradigm for Protecting
Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity, supra note 157,
construct a highly nuanced model of legal capacity. They propose three types of decision-making status – independent,
supported, and facilitated – reflecting distinct functional
abilities and supports. The standard applicable to independent decision-making is similar to existing functional standards, despite a different theoretical frame. In contrast, supported decision-making status is attracted where one is able
to express one’s intention, with supports (intention being a
clearer indication of preference than will), or alternatively, to
express one’s will or to have support persons discern one’s will
in light of their familiarity with one’s wider “life narrative.”
Facilitated decision-making status (which requires recourse
to a form of substitute decision-making) is reserved for situations in which no one can discern a person’s contemporaneous will or intent, although the support person must remain
vigilant for expressions of will.
166.	D eclaration (registered upon Canada’s accession to the
Convention, March 11, 2010, available at <http://treat i e s . u n . o r g / Pa ge s / V i e w D e t a i l s . a s p x ? m t d s g _ n o = I V15&chapter=4&lang=en> (last visited March 1, 2013).
167.	“Australia recognizes that persons with disability enjoy
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of
life. Australia declares its understanding that the Convention
allows for fully supported or substituted decision-making
arrangements, which provide for decisions to be made on
behalf of a person, only where such arrangements are necessary, as a last resort and subject to safeguards” (registered
upon Australia’s accession to the Convention, July 17, 2008).
Available at <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang=en> (last visited
March 1, 2013).
168.	Declarations on point were made by Egypt and the Syrian
Arab Republic. Iran declared that it does not consider itself
bound by any of the terms of the Convention inconsistent
with its existing rules. Declarations are available at <http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV15&chapter=4&lang=en > (last visited March 1, 2013). For
discussion of the asserted distinction between “capacity for
rights” and “capacity to act,” see Background Conference
Document Prepared by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights: Legal Capacity, available
at <www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc6documents.
htm> (last visited February 4, 2013); “Abolishing Mental
Health Laws to Comply with the CRPD,” supra note 121, at
159-160; “Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention,”
supra note 85, at 442-445, 453-455.
169.	Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article
35 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Spain (Sixth
session, 19-23 September 2011), at para. 34. See also Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Consideration
of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the
Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Tunisia (Fifth session,
April 11-15, 2011), at para. 23; Committee on the Rights of
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Persons with Disabilities, Consideration of reports submitted
by States Parties under Article 35 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities: Peru (Seventh session, April16-20, 2012),
at para. 25.
170.	The Special Rapporteur on Torture has stated: “States must
adopt legislation that recognizes the legal capacity of persons
with disabilities and must ensure that, where required, they
are provided with the support needed to make informed decisions.” (Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, July 28, 2008, UN Doc A/63/175, at para. 73.) Also
see the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
Resolution 1642 (2009) on access to rights for people with
disabilities and their full and active participation in society,
January 6, 2009, para. 7.
171.	“The Committee held days of general discussion on article 12
(Equal recognition before the law) of the Convention in 2009
and on article 9 (Accessibility) of the Convention in 2010 to
support the formulation by the Committee of general comments on these issues. The days of general discussion were
attended by representatives of States parties, civil society and
others.” (“Status of the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and the Optional Protocol thereto (Report of
the Secretary-General,” July 7, 2011, Doc A/66/121, available
at <www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=712> (last visited
February 4, 2013) [hereinafter cited as “Status of the Convention”]. And see Ron MacAllum, Chair, Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, “Call for Papers on the
Practical and Theoretical Measures for the Implementation
of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities” (papers to be submitted by July
17, 2011), available at <www2.ohchr.org/SPdocs/CRPD/Call_
for_papers_art12.doc> (last visited March 1, 2013).
172.	Kayess and French argue that uncritical assertions of the
social model lie behind the IDC positions on decision-making
capacity: “Ultimately, the CRPD has been most influenced by
an uncritical, populist, understanding of the social model of
disability. At times this understanding approaches a radical
social constructionist view of disability, in which impairment
has no underlying reality. While the central tenet of the social
model – disability as social oppression – has not been superseded, it has been heavily nuanced and qualified by the last
decade of critical disability studies, which has re-emphasised
the realities of impairment as a dimension of the ontological and phenomenological experience of disability. If there is
truly to be a shift to a coherent new disability rights paradigm
in international law, it will be important that CRPD interpretation and implementation efforts penetrate beyond populist
social model ideas to a more sophisticated understanding of
impairment and disability in its social context.” See supra
note 34, at 34.
173.	Some jurisdictions’ supported decision-making mechanisms
have attracted significant attention (for instance, B.C.’s regime
under the Representation Agreement Act, supra note 150 (not
a comprehensive alternative to guardianship laws, but rather
a mechanism for individual appointment of a support person), and Sweden’s regime of the “god-man”; see the World
Report on Disability, supra note 13, at 138 (Box 5.1) (a form
of ombudsperson assigned to offer persons with psychosocial
disabilities a variety of supports). The arguments of the IDC
for absolute displacement of guardianship or substitute decision-making went beyond any existing model. See “Abolishing
Mental Health Laws to Comply with the CRPD,” supra note
121, at 160-166, esp. 161.
174.	Terry Carney observes, on the subject of evaluating options
for reforming guardianship laws on the model of supported
decision-making: “these are ultimately research questions
which need to be settled in light of evidence about what is
and is not helpful in the lived lives of people with impaired
functional capacity, and with due regard to the hard lessons
of past policies which demonstrate that policies often have
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unintended (and sometimes surprisingly disappointing) outcomes compared to those expected.” (“Guardianship, ‘Social’
Citizenship and Theorizing Substitute Decision-Making Law,”
supra note 130, at 14) My point is that such research should
also attend to the perspectives of those likely to be subject to,
or vulnerable to, the laws under scrutiny.
175.	See, e.g., C. Mackenzie and N. Stoljar, eds., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the
Social Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) [hereinafter Relational Autonomy]; J. Downie and J. Llewellyn,
eds., Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and
Health Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011). See also Susan
Stefan’s groundbreaking analysis of the power dimensions
of incompetency determinations, “Silencing the Different
Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory, and Law,” University of
Miami Law Review 47, no. 3 (1993): 763-815.
176.	See, e.g., C. McLeod and S. Sherwin, “Relational Autonomy,
Self-Trust, and Health Care for Patients who are Oppressed,”
in Relational Autonomy, id., at 259-279.
177.	I take this list of “philosophy’s most cherished conceptions”
from L. Carlson and E. F. Kittay, “Introduction: Rethinking
Philosophical Assumptions in Light of Cognitive Disability,”
in L. Carlson and E. F. Kittay, Cognitive Disability and Its
Challenge to Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell,
2010): 1-26.
178.	See Mental Health Act 2011: A Review, supra note 80, at 246.
179.	See also Janet Lord’s discussion of the democratic deficit in
global health governance (at and beyond the WHO), and the
prospects of the CRPD’s redressing this in some measure, in
“Global Health Governance,” supra note 4, at 575-576.
180.	See S. M. Rothman et al., “Health Advocacy Organizations
and the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Analysis of Disclosure
Practices,” American Journal of Public Health 101, no. 4
(2011): 602-609.
181.	An account of recent implementation activities is given in the
report “Status of the Convention,” supra note 171.
182.	See id. at paras. 23-24 for discussion of the activities of
the Inter-Agency Support Group for the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and paras. 22-63 for a
broader discussion of inter-agency activity as well as cooperation with states and civil society groups aimed at CRPD
implementation. The document notes in particular that the
WHO / World Bank World Report on Disability, supra note
13, “has been developed with the full participation of persons
with disabilities and their organizations, and will help raise
awareness of the rights of persons with disabilities” (para. 54).
183.	See “Status of the Convention” supra note 171, at paras. 15-20.
184.	Examples include the UN Partnership on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (UNPRPD) (sponsored by the
WHO and five other UN agencies): see UN Development Programme, Press Release: “New United Nations
Fund to Boost Action on Disability Rights,” December 8, 2011, available at <http://www.bing.com/
search?q=UN%20Development%20Programme%2c%20
Press%20Release:%20%e2%80%9cNew%20United%20
N a t i o n s % 2 0 Fu n d % 2 0 t o % 2 0 B o o s t % 2 0 A c t i o n % 2 0
on%20Disability%20Rights%e2%80%9d%20
&FORM=LEMBLB&PC=MALC&QS=n> (last visited February 4, 2013); the Disability Rights Fund <www.disabilityrightsfund.org/> and Australia’s AusAID <www.ausaid.gov.
au/> (both last visited February 4, 2013).
185.	See “Status of the Convention,” supra note 171, at paras.
64-70. Also see “Multi-stakeholder partnerships,” at paras.
71-75.
186.	The cooperative capacity-building efforts of the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre are described at <http://mdac.info/
en/what-we-do/capacity-building> (last visited February 4,
2013). Another striking example is Disabled Persons International’s engagement in consultations with persons with
disabilities and their representative organizations in Tunisia,
in March 2011, in order to prepare a shadow report in the
face of that nation’s significant political instability during that

journal of law, medicine & ethics

Sheila Wildeman
period. Ultimately DPI prepared two shadow reports: available at <http://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/en/
crpd-reports-0> (last visited February 4, 2013). On the role
of the UN agency UNFPA (the United Nations Population
Fund) in facilitating capacity-building among DPOs in Syria
in December 2010, see “Status of the Convention,” supra note
171, at para. 62. Further UN efforts to build capacity among
DPOs are described in the same document at paras. 55-63.
187.	
World Report on Disability, supra note 13, at 138 (Box 5.1);
K. Guernsey et al., Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities: Its Implementation and Relevance for the World
Bank, Social Protection Discussion Paper No 0712 (The
World Bank, June 2007), available at <http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Disability-DP/0712.pdf> (last visited February 4, 2013). The latter report states (at 12-13):
		Whilst Article 12 does not explicitly prohibit guardianship laws, it is anticipated that many States Parties will
move away from traditional guardianship approaches,
and/or utilize such procedures only in rare circumstances where an individual is in need of extensive or
‘one hundred percent support.’ It is therefore reasonable
to expect that a number of client countries will need
assistance in engaging in legislative reform initiatives to
effect these changes, as well as assistance in developing
programmes and policies to implement the obligation to
provide supports to those requiring assistance to exercise their legal capacity.
188.	A rich example of such work is Shari McDaid and Sarah
Delaney’s “A Social Approach to Decision-Making Capacity,”
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supra note 157. In “Abolishing Mental Health Laws to Comply
with the CRPD,” supra note 121, at 160-166, Tina Minkowitz discusses ongoing research into innovative supportive
policies and practices, including an Indian study focused on
traditional healing centres and the exploratory work of the
U.K.-initiated Hearing Voices network, Intervoice (The International Community for Hearing Voices, available at <www.
intervoiceonline.org/> [last visited February 4, 2013]). Also
see the results of a broad-based consultation of persons with
psychosocial disabilities concerning their opinions about and
experiences of violation of CRPD rights, in N. Drew et al.,
“Human Rights Violations of People with Mental and Psychosocial Disabilities: An Unresolved Global Crisis,” The Lancet
378, no. 9803 (2011): 1664-1675. The article describes the
WHO’s QualityRights Project, which involves standardized
assessment of human rights compliance in mental health
facilities and social care homes.
189.	See V. Topp et al., Lacking Insight – Involuntary Patient
Experience of the Victorian Mental Health Review Board (The
Mental Health Legal Centre Inc., October 2008), available
at <www.communitylaw.org.au/mhlc/cb_pages/li_contents.
php> (last visited February 4, 2013).
190.	The challenges raised by this imperative to the CRPD’s status-based framework of rights and obligations are discussed in B.
Ribet, “Emergent Disability and the Limits of Equality: A Critical
Reading of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,” Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 14,
no. 1 (2011): 155-203, at 191-193.
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